Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s *Pan-Europa* as the Elusive “Object of Longing”

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The Austro-Hungarian intellectual Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972) saw the end of World War I as the ideal time to finally create the centuries-old “object of longing,” i.e., a peaceful, united Europe (Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan Europe* 8). In doing so, he inspired a large additional body of literature and a movement for a unified Europe which exists, albeit in a much-reduced role, down to the present day. I locate his magnum opus, *Pan-Europa* in the continuum of German-language treatments of Europe as a political project. This interwar text is especially interesting for scholars as it represents a rare bourgeois dissent against nationalistic pretensions prevalent in many other Weimar-era political treatises on the cultural position of Germany and Europe in the wider world. *Pan-Europa* contains much of interest beyond utopian policy prescriptions for interwar European statesmen, illuminating discussions on the pace, scope, and goals of European integration into the present day.

In postwar Western Europe and the United States this text has occasionally been of interest to political scientists and European intellectual historians while remaining virtually unknown in literary histories. Where it is mentioned, *Pan-Europa* has most often been viewed as a failed modernist blueprint for defending democratic, capitalist, political institutions and geopolitical imperatives binding both “halves” of Europe. Today, it is in Central European countries, especially Poland, Slovakia, and the Baltics, where much current research is being done into the Pan-European movement begun by this slim volume. Also, since Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was half-Japanese, born of an Austro-Hungarian nobleman-diplomat and a Japanese mother, one also finds many monographs on his life in Japanese, as well as translations of early philosophical works of his.

A wider interdisciplinary re-evaluation of *Pan-Europa* brings to light many aspects useful in understanding both the evolution of the European idea in German letters and current debates concerning united Europe. Chief among these is a tension between rational models of “treaties and rights” and early Romantic notions of an organically united Germany at intellectual war with Enlightenment (i.e., French)
political and cultural traditions. Two quite innovative and controversial aspects for his day, namely forceful calls for continental disarmament and rapprochement between France and Germany as essential preconditions for peace, recall essays of prior centuries. A controversial topic in our own day is also mentioned in his text: the tradition of finding a place for religion as a supporting pillar of a future European identity. These and other features of Pan-Europe contribute to a richer illustration of its continuity with other German works arguing for peaceful European cooperation, of which Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795) might be considered the first, best example. After a brief history of the man and the movement, we shall see how Pan-Europa integrates important antecedent concepts and provided his contemporaries a basis upon which to theorize more productively a unified Europe.

It is first important to note how widely known this text was between 1923 and 1938, when it went through seven editions and was translated into every major world language, extending awareness of the work beyond Europe to readers of Japanese, Chinese, and Arabic. Other integral parts of this literary-political project included: a monthly magazine (PANEUROPA) to which contemporary politicians, intellectuals, and private citizens of many European nations contributed; Pan-European committees throughout Europe; and congresses held every few years in different European capitals beginning in 1924. Its secretariat was originally based in Vienna’s Hofburg Palace and its symbol, then as today, is “a red cross upon a golden sun…the cross of Christ upon the sun of Apollo…this symbol on a light blue background.” In choosing these symbols, Coudenhove-Kalergi symbolically united Christian principles with Greek humanism and arrayed them on a symbolic “blue sky, representing untarnished peace” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa 1922 bis 1966 58; translation mine).

This treatise had prominent supporters throughout interwar Europe, both because of the practical steps toward peace outlined there and the tireless efforts of its author in publicizing the book and the movement. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s political allies included Prime Minister Eduard Herriot (France) and Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann (Germany). Others included Reichstag President Paul Löbe, and the Austrian leaders Ignaz Seipel and Karl Renner, the latter the first President of postwar Austria. Engelbert Dollfuß and Kurt Schuschnigg, Austria’s last two pre-Anschluss Chancellors, also had important leadership roles. In the literary sphere, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s most famous interwar fellow-travelers included Heinrich Mann, Heinrich’s brother Thomas (originally opposed to his plans but later a supporter), and Kurt Hiller. Others such as Paul Valery, Gerhart Hauptmann, Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan Zweig, Franz Werfel, and Arthur Schnitzler regularly corresponded with him as well.
Even Einstein and Freud exchanged letters with him on an ongoing basis until the Nazi regime forced many into exile. ⁸

Another measure of the influence of the interwar Pan-European movement is that it created strong political and cultural opposition in Germany, the country Coudenhove-Kalergi considered his second home and first political success. ⁹ Conservative opponents took him seriously enough to write many essays opposed to the Pan-European ideal in both literature and politics. A typical polemic from a German university professor in 1930 criticized Coudenhove-Kalergi’s efforts as follows:

This thing called “Pan-Europe” was not invented after the Great War, and certainly not by the horrible Austrian who preaches it. Rather, it always shows its face when France is very near to its highest political goal: Rule over Europe. (Geißler 34)

As authors of the period were aware, the term “French” was always pejorative code for German conservatives, denoting a noxious Other on so many levels: political, social, religious, and cultural. ¹⁰ Thus the raising of a French specter behind Coudenhove’s efforts for disarmament, peace, and European unification was to argue simultaneously for the German Sonderweg. It was, of course, precisely this Sonderweg that Coudenhove-Kalergi opposed all his life with his theories and political praxis.

After Hitler’s forces occupied Austria, Coudenhove-Kalergi moved to Switzerland, then Paris, where his influence among the political and literary elites rapidly waned in the face of the understandably more pressing cultural and political challenges posed by the Nazis. In 1942 he immigrated to New York and there founded the “Research Seminar for a Federative Postwar Europe” at New York University. The seminar was assisted in its work by the American Committee for a Free and United Europe led by Senator William Fulbright. In 1946, Coudenhove-Kalergi returned to Switzerland to found the Pan-European Union and again lobby intensively for a political, economic, and cultural union among the nations of Europe, then limited to the “free nations” of Western Europe.

At first, it seemed he would regain his old influence. When Winston Churchill famously called for a “United States of Europe” in a speech in Zürich in 1946, he explicitly referenced Coudenhove-Kalergi as one of only two people whose work inspired that goal. ¹¹ Shortly before this, however, Churchill had given his famous “Iron Curtain” speech, and it is those thoughts, not the Pan-Europe of Coudenhove-Kalergi, which remained more influential through the Cold War years. As technocrats, politicians, and lawyers rather than intellectuals assumed the vanguard of the movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi became increasingly marginalized and devoted his remaining years to nourishing pro-European networks among the
politically powerful in Western Europe and writing his autobiography. He died in Schruns, Austria in 1972.\footnote{12}

His magnum opus \textit{Pan-Europe} begins, as many of the other classic German essays on Europe do, with an introductory chapter in which Coudenhove-Kalergi highlights previous failed attempts at European unification stretching back into Charlemagne’s day. \textit{Pan-Europe} then makes a rhetorically effective case for an economically, culturally, and politically united European community of nations by presenting readers with a stark choice: one can either uphold an Enlightenment belief in the power of unlimited progress through reason, or choose the fatal alternative of national decay and disintegration through cultural disunity, leading ultimately to a war of annihilation. Once, “world policy was more or less identical to European policy” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Pan Europe} 3).\footnote{13} Yet now, recovering from World War I, these formerly great European nations are “burdened with debt, disrupted, restless and enfeebled, gravely reduced in [their] populative and industrial strength, floundering in economic and monetary chaos” (8). Just as Julius Fröbel had written in his influential pro-European essay \textit{The Present European State System} (1864), Coudenhove-Kalergi imagines a Russo-Turkish military threat and a U.S. economic and cultural threat. Since “Europe as a political concept does not exist” (16),\footnote{14} are these individual European nations “bound, in order to preserve their existence, to organize into a federal union?” (xiv). His answer is of course affirmative, inspired by the Pan-American movement earlier in the century: “Self-help through the consolidation of Europe into an ad hoc politico-economic federation” (xv). Significantly, the federation should not simply be defensive or military-economic in nature, but proudly and proactively cultural and political.

\textit{Pan-Europe} thus swiftly moves beyond contemporary geopolitical concerns to posit the existence of long-buried common European cultural roots in need of renewed cultivation. Benedict Anderson has persuasively described a dynamic whereby peoples construct imagined unified communities in response to catastrophic societal upheavals. Reading \textit{Pan-Europe}, one easily concludes that the fratricidal tendencies unleashed by World War I motivated Coudenhove-Kalergi to postulate a new identity around which peaceful forces might coalesce as Anderson outlines. He imagined a culturally united Europe as a response, with no need for standing armies or internal, nation-state based enemies. As such, his plans at once reflect and transcend the purely defensive ideas found in earlier German plans for European unification such as Fröbel’s above, which attempted to convince nations to unite based on geopolitical threats while retaining strong militaries. A comprehensive European disarmament plan is part of \textit{Pan-Europe}, and perhaps its most revolutionary idea for politicians in the 1920s:
Either the universal militia system could be introduced or universal compulsory service could be completely abolished. The moral and economic progress achieved thereby would be inestimable. (69)

His calls for disarmament also reflect the productive appeals to reason inherent in Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* (1795) and Arnold Ruge’s speech in the Frankfurt Parliament (1848) on the necessity of disarmament for any lasting peace. A future united Europe, writes Coudenhove-Kalergi, like the Pan-American Union, should not be “directed against any other state-system, but solely against war, and toward furthering the cultural progress of all” (11).

*Pan-Europe* contains several other innovative re-imagining of solutions to cultural-historical rivalries, many of which would find their way into Christian Democratic and Social Democratic policies throughout Western Europe in the postwar years. These both dialectically resolve old tensions and introduce new opposing ideas into the European cultural mix. Consider Coudenhove-Kalergi’s treatment of Soviet Russia. On the one hand, he writes dismissively that “Russia, in consequence of its breach with the democratic system, has placed itself outside Europe” (36). Certainly, the exclusion of Russia from geographical definitions of “Europe” has a long tradition in German letters, going as far back as the works of the Catholic Greater German, Joseph Görres. Indeed, the idea that Russia should not be considered culturally European precedes even these geopolitical analyses, and remained a popular theme in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s day.15

*Pan-Europe*’s strident anti-Communist tone is not unique to 1920s European essays. Championing a union of European states as the answer to this “Bolshevist danger,” as opposed to seeing the “Russian problem” strictly through a nationalist-militarist lens, allowed seeds of a dialectical movement to germinate. These seeds would bear fruit after World War II. Coudenhove-Kalergi writes:

> The unanimous aim of all Europeans, regardless of party or nation, should be the prevention of a Russian invasion.... The only wise thing for Europe to do is pursue…a Pan-European defensive pact against the Russian menace. (60-61)

The similarities between these ideas and the policies of postwar West German leaders, especially those of Kurt Schumacher and Konrad Adenauer, are obvious. Yet their solution was to (re-)arm Europe through NATO and retreat into a defensive Western European economic alliance in the European Community. Coudenhove-Kalergi, from the 1920s through the 1950s, argued instead for continued dialogue and detente with the Eastern Bloc—a sort of pre-Brandt, realist *Ostpolitik* in which disarmament was not to be a taboo topic, and in which “Western Europe” could not be identical with “Europe.”16 Here, an imagined common European culture mitigates against military solutions to differences of opinion over specific governmental forms and
regimes: “An indifferent neighborliness is no longer possible. Europe can become only either the stage of perpetual war or perpetual peace” (116).

As can be traced from the above, the necessity for Germany and France to become partners instead of rivals is also a central plank of his European project. It deserves special mention because this position, despite being a commonplace in the postwar era, was not shared by most of the audience Pan-Europe first addressed. Reading today that “as Germans and Frenchmen, the same people are opponents who should be allies” (127), or that “The destinies of Germany and France are inseparably bound together” (137), one must recall how out of place such sentiments were among the vast majority of Weimar Germany’s intellectuals. The Enlightenment aspects of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s project are clear: “A solidarity of reason must arise … even where no room yet exists for a solidarity of love” (138). In visualizing ever-closer union among European nations, initiated by and modeled on Franco-German reconciliation, he anticipates the organic, functionalist nature of the EU. Equally fascinating, he eerily prefigures the actual rational, realist basis of moves toward European integration in the immediate postwar era.

No less central to the Pan-European project were the protection and self-determination of Eastern European peoples so recently liberated from Austro-Hungarian and Russian cultural and political hegemony. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s analysis,

This [national] revolution in Eastern Europe marks a decisive stage on the road to Pan-Europe. For thanks to it, Europe received a coherent structure [eine einheitliche Physiognomie] on the basis of nationhood and of democracy…. Thereby the foundation has been laid for a Pan-European union of free nations. (120)

This passage well illustrates Pan-Europe’s unique, organic, dialectic movement regarding European and national policies: co-opting the nationalist and conservative-bourgeois geopolitical thinking of the Weimar years, Coudenhove-Kalergi pays rhetorical homage to national movements of liberation throughout Central Europe. At the same time, however, he slyly reminds the reader that a loosely-organized “Europe of Fatherlands” is not a completely developed Europe. The organic body imagery present in the German original signals its intellectual affinities with earlier treatises on Europe from the German Romantics such as Novalis and Gentz, who both called for all European peoples and nations to unite under one “head,” whether religious (Novalis) or secular (Gentz). This passage also helps explain Pan-Europe’s attractiveness to Christian Democratic politicians in the post-World War II years and Central European politicians in the post-Wall era. The Communist division of Europe was envisioned as an unnatural, inorganic amputation of nations and peoples from each other, and the imperative underlying the formation of a European
Community was to restore the lost limbs with the torso, whether after World War I, World War II, or the Cold War.

Pan-Europe’s specific plans for European integration, especially as regards its treaty-based, intergovernmentalist beginnings, uncannily anticipate many central aspects of how the postwar Western European community developed. This lends an additional dimension of curiosity to the work. Hearkening back to Kant, Novalis, Ruge, and others, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s first step towards creation of a European union of states is the convening of a conference of leaders to create a unification treaty among their nations. This would be followed by: treaties of binding arbitration between states; a European disarmament conference; elimination of internal borders; creation of a European customs union and common currency; an inter-European exchange of teachers, students, and children; and much more.\(^{19}\) Crowning these endeavors would be creation of a “Constitution of the United States of Europe, after the pattern of the United States of America” (169-175). Implied in this is a quite energetic, “inorganic” receptivity to a loss of national sovereignty rarely seen in other texts of this nature in Weimar Germany.

What is especially interesting here for both political scientists and cultural historians is that culturally conservative, organic state language is sprinkled throughout the document at the same time that democratic, supranational solutions are being proposed to remedy Europe’s ills. There is talk of needing to find “a compromise between freedom and order,” of trying to meet the “synthetic needs” of Europe’s citizens, and fighting against a disunited “chaos of peoples and nations.” Coudenhove-Kalergi rails against the “inorganic, mechanical” unifying process of the League of Nations, though not the worthy peaceful ideas underlying it (89). And, as with many other conservative-organic thinkers, he echoes Novalis in imagining the long-past days of the Holy Roman Empire as representing the high point of European culture.

During the Middle Ages, when European culture, despite the differences of language, was uniformly Christian, the occident felt its national unity far more strongly than it does today; for at the time of the Crusades Europe had one Faith, one God, one Pope, one chivalric ideal, one learned language. (156-157)

Of course, the cosmopolitan European nobleman sees there is no desirability in re-creating a specifically Catholic order of things. Still, Coudenhove-Kalergi sees the need for some transcendent unifying concept so that “a German inhabitant, say, of Czech-Slovakia…must endeavor to be a good Czecho-Slovak citizen, and an honest German” (168). The transcendental, dialectically productive idea is that of “Europe,” which should lose the quotation marks surrounding it as one imagines it as having existed in the past. His question, following World Wars I and II is, “Why
should enriching [regional and national] patriotisms with a third, a European one, be considered impossible?” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa 1922 bis 1966 15; translation mine).

Religion is the best transcendental concept necessary to cement the unification of Europe, since “Europe is bound together by the Christian religion, European science, art and culture, which rest on a Christian-Hellenic basis” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan Europe 162). This dialectical movement, the Aufhebung of national and regional cultural-linguistic particularities by drawing upon a higher imagined cultural memory, seems at first glance hopelessly antiquated. Indeed, such a notion was also certainly not a potent draw for nationalist intellectuals inclined to organic thinking during Weimar Germany and interwar Austria. Yet calling to mind the current discussions over an explicit reference to Christianity in the preamble to the new EU constitution, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s raising of this issue seems less a Novalian anachronism than at first glance.

Certain modernist elements in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plan also echo those of the French liberal nationalist Ernest Renan. In his famous essay “What is a Nation?” (1882), he postulates that a supranational European confederation might someday take the place of sovereign national governments, themselves transitory in nature. Pan-Europe’s call for a final, federated, yet culturally, politically, and economically united Europe echoes this. Also, we read in Renan that neither common racial and linguistic characteristics nor geographical boundaries are necessary and sufficient conditions for nation-building. Like Renan, and Julius Fröbel before him, Coudenhove-Kalergi uses the example of Switzerland to show how, rather than being exclusive communities, the best European nations are in fact inclusive “symbioses, communities of interaction, between great men and their peoples” (155). Like Herder, Coudenhove-Kalergi can state, “Every [individual] nation is a sanctuary—as the hearth and home of culture, as the point of crystallization for morality and progress” (161). Yet at the same time, with Novalis, he can claim that “[t]he cultural unity of the Occident gives us the right to speak of a European nation” (163). Here lies the innovation of Pan-Europe as regards the dialectic interaction between the national and European levels: each nation should be free to develop its particular national characteristics on its own. Yet where a collection of nations’ historical-cultural ties differentiate them from other “world cultures,” they should be encouraged to unite to preserve and protect unique symbioses. Each tension thus calls forth and mutually reinforces the other on a third, unifying level.

For all its unique and progressive elements relative to other Weimar treatises on Germany’s role in Europe, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s work does carry significant ideological baggage. These illustrate several disturbing affinities with conservative
intellectual traditions of the time. Certainly, *Pan-Europa* occupies a place on the spectrum unambiguously out of the nationalist or anti-Semitic orbit. Yet its triumphalist tone with regard to “European culture” and its often reflexive recourse to geopolitical concerns do not allow it to achieve the legacy of literary treatments of European culture found in other authors of the period. One searches in vain for Eurochauvinist themes in Stefan Zweig’s collected essays and memoirs, or Thomas Mann’s post-1921 essays and speeches, for example. Mann’s insightful postwar formulation that what is needed is “not a German Europe, but a European Germany” significantly echoes many aspects of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own interwar ideology (Mann, *Ansprache* 194).

Yet in contrast to these authors, Coudenhove-Kalergi states that only European culture can be “essentially activist and rationalist ... while the other cultures are fast decaying, European culture marches triumphantly on.... It would appear that a century hence, European culture will have absorbed all other cultures” (29-30). It is a contradictory and ultimately unsophisticated argument, though presented with considerable rhetorical flourish. As such, it allows him to claim, for example, that American culture, “optimistic, aspiring, energetic and progressive” (30), is actually part of overall European culture, but only because it has indeed proven itself to be a rival to Europe and needs to be co-opted. Geopolitical realities also often inform his cultural argument, fatally affecting the rigor of his analysis. This is especially true during World War II, where he is seen often to speak of “an ‘Atlantic Union’ of Western Civilization… the most powerful association on earth” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, *The Future of Europe and America*).

Another aspect marking *Pan-Europa* as a product well in line with literature of the organic, bourgeois-conservative, Germanic tradition is that, as we have seen above, it defines “European” as being explicitly Christian and resolutely anti-Communist. At the very least, European culture is said to be proudly “distinct from the Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, and Confucian cultures of Asia” (29). There are unpleasant echoes of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of cultures” theory here which cannot be ignored, and upon which a secular European Union as has existed since 1959 cannot be successfully built in the long term. And, as we have seen above, Coudenhove-Kalergi is not shy in employing this imagined Christian community to bolster his claims that all non-Orthodox European nations should be unified. This, together with his Eurocentric predilections with regard to the development of world cultures, makes his repeated religious-political references to a “European cultural mission” (48) predictable if not defensible.

For a variety of reasons and with widely differing motives, a considerable number of German intellectuals have long held a united Europe as that “object of longing”
referred to in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s text, as Lützeler’s anthologies well illustrate. Yet as in previous centuries, *Pan-Europa* eventually became only one of many competing roadmaps to peace on the European continent in the 20th century. In the postwar years, appeals to shared cultural ties lost pride of place to geopolitical and economic definitions of Europe based on Cold War influences. Yet several prescient diagnoses of European malaise, political impotence, and struggles against national cultural superiority in the early 1900s remain valid today. His work not only anticipates the contemporary debates over whether Turkey and Russia belong in a united Europe and whether explicit references to religion should be included in the new EU constitution, but also laments the lack of a unified European cultural space and a functioning European government. At the same time, one can appreciate the exemplary interwar effort to imagine a more inclusive definition of what “Europe” should encompass and the high degree to which Coudenhove-Kalergi demands these nations should be integrated. For the historian, *Pan-Europa* demonstrates how far European nations have moved towards equality and respect for different cultures within Europe, however defined. It likewise outlines the artificial limits and continued dangers of an exclusive focus on the imagined benefits of these (Western) European traditions, cultures, and histories. These dialectical oppositions serve to illuminate how long this “object of longing” has remained elusive, and how this elusiveness has inspired many German intellectuals such as Count Coudenhove-Kalergi to keep trying to attain it.

Notes

1 First published in English as *Pan-Europe* in 1926.

2 This term is borrowed from Paul Michael Lützeler, whose anthologies of European literary essays are the few sources where one can find *Pan-Europa* mentioned within a literary-historical framework. See especially his *Europa: Analysen und Visionen der Romantiker* for a more complete definition of the term.

3 Even very sympathetic recent works on Coudenhove-Kalergi and the *Pan-Europa* movement come to similar conclusions regarding Coudenhove’s practical effects in the postwar period, no matter how glowingly they describe the Count as interwar visionary. See Conze, Dészy, and Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler.

4 It is perhaps no coincidence that these historians, many of whose nations joined the European Union in 2004, would investigate an all-too-rare German work which traced and celebrated their common European cultural heritage.
Certainly, the arguments contained in *Perpetual Peace* were eventually meant to apply universally: i.e., they were not limited strictly to European nations and peoples. Still, it is commonly understood that Europe would be the region of the world in which they would first be expected to come close to productive realization.

Here, one could cite other “classic” works in addition to *Perpetual Peace*. These include *Christianity; or Europe* (1798) by Novalis, *Europe and America* (1820) by Conrad von Schmidt-Phiseldek, *The Present European State System* (1864) by Julius Fröbel, and Thomas Mann’s *Achtung Europe* (1938), among others.

A comprehensive list of prominent Europeans who supported the movement inspired by Coudenhove-Kalergi in the interwar years cannot be presented in the space provided here. Nonetheless, persons who deserve mention include the German banker Max Warburg, the Czech politicians Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, Leo Amery and Winston Churchill from the UK, President Woodrow Wilson, Russian President Alexander Kerensky, and Aristide Briand, Alexis Léger and Yvon Delbos from France (see Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europa 1922 bis 1966* 59-66).

See Dézsy for a more exhaustive list of correspondents, as well as the story of how the chests containing significant numbers of his stored letters disappeared without a trace on the ocean passage to America after the Count’s exile from Europe.

Although Coudenhove-Kalergi was a proud Austrian, he found little initial success in his home country. It was in Germany (with the Social Democratic Party) and France that his ideas first took political root and it was their authors who were first inspired to promote his plans in their prose. A typical German conservative trope was therefore to brand him “Austrian” first, and then “French” if that failed: an ironic move, to be sure, as many of these conservatives were themselves proponents of a united Germany-Austria.

The most articulate and thorough expression of this Franco-German antagonism in the Weimar era can doubtless be found in Thomas Mann’s *Reflections of a Non-Political Man* (1918). Mann would refute many of these elitist-nationalist views in *Von deutscher Republik* (1926), later fully supporting the Pan-European movement, as his brother Heinrich had from its inception. Yet such “conversions” were rare in the 1920s.


National bureaus of the Pan-European Union still exist in Europe, serving mainly as social networks for nobility and upwardly mobile persons. With the technocratic aspects of integration having established ideological hegemony, the Pan-European Union today sees its role as to stress the importance of attending to cultural aspects of European integration. Its current Honorary Chairman is Otto von Habsburg, the grandson of the last Austro-Hungarian emperor. See http://www.paneuropa.org.

Quotes from *Pan-Europe* in this article are taken from the first English edition (1926).
This indictment of all major European intellectuals, as Coudenhove-Kalergi formulates it, is all the more negative from a European cultural perspective as it has been six years since the armistice (see Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europa 1922 bis 1966* 42).

Even non-nationalist authors such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Heinrich Mann preferred Goethe to Dostoevsky when searching for literary representatives of the “European spirit.”

For example, one can contrast Coudenhove-Kalergi’s generally hopeful view of disarmament in arguing for trust-building steps with the Soviets on the one hand with Konrad Adenauer’s dismissive response to the Stalin Note in 1952 on the other.

See, for example, the aforementioned *Reflections of a Non-Political Man* for intellectual positions Coudenhove-Kalergi was combating here.

In the 1926 English translation, this sentence reads “The natural revolution....” Yet in the original German, this sentence begins with “Die nationale Revolution....” This deviation from the source text fails to capture the highly organic imagery of the passage. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s cunning rhetoric in this passage is further illustrated by his use of the word *Physiognomie*, perhaps misleadingly translated as “structure” in English editions.

The affinities between this plan and such postwar European policies as the Single European Act, the Schengen Agreement and the introduction of the Euro are obvious. Note here the intellectual foundations being laid for the ERASMUS and SOKRATES student exchange programs as well.

Representative works of this genre include those of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), Othmar Spann (1878-1950), and Jakob Baxa (1895-1979), among others.

Note the use of the word “culture” in the singular.

This aspect, along with his overt praise of capitalism, led the prominent Weimar intellectual Kurt Hiller, along with other leftist-oriented thinkers, to break with Coudenhove (see Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Kurt Hiller contra Coudenhove. Zwei offene Briefe”).

It will be remembered that the Count was half Japanese. Whether the roots of his division of the non-European world into distinct, possibly inferior, cultural spheres lie therefore in his personal history or are born of geopolitical considerations is a matter for additional research. Many of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s literary contemporaries including Hesse and Mann were fascinated by many aspects of the Orient, and tracing his intellectual debts to those authors could be an additional fruitful avenue of inquiry.
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